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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

KENNETH JAMES MORRELL,
Petitioner,

Supreme Court
Case No.

v.
Court of Appeals
Case No. 890031-CA

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

Priority No. 13

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Mr. Morrell was convicted of robbing Matthew Moor, a pizza
delivery person, in September of 1988. Mr. Morrell admitted that it
was his intent to take money from Mr. Moor, and his actions were
reflective of that intent.

As supposed proof of Mr. Moor's intent,

the Court of Appeals condoned the admission of evidence of
Mr. Morrell's robbery of a pizza delivery person in June of 1988
(hereinafter referred to as "the extrinsic robbery").

The following

question is presented for this Court's consideration:
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b), is
evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts
admissible to show "intent" when the requisite
level of criminal intent is merely a formal issue
that may be inferred from the physical actions of
the defendant?
In the event that this Court allows briefing on the merits,
Mr. Morrell also seeks permission to address three related issues
that were raised before the Court of Appeals, but omitted from the
opinion, concerning (1) the failure of the extrinsic robbery to
prove Mr. Morrell's intent some three months after the extrinsic

robbery; (2) the impact of instructing the jury that the evidence of
the extrinsic robbery could be used for impeachment and as "proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident"; and (3) the similarity of the
extrinsic robbery and the crime charged, resulting in the heightened
likelihood that the jurors convicted Mr. Morrell on the basis of his
perceived propensity to rob pizza delivery people.

Mr. Morrell

notifies this Court of these related issues in an effort to preserve
his arguments for briefing on the merits, but does not contend that
these related issues justify issuance of a writ.

OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals' decision and order denying rehearing
are reproduced in Appendix 1.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The Court of Appeals' decision was filed on November 30,
1990.

The Court of Appeals' order denying rehearing was signed on

January 15, 1991.
This Court's statutory jurisdiction over this petition for
certiorari is provided by Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(5).
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISION
Utah Rule of Evidence 404
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence
of a person's character or a trait of his
character is not admissible for the purpose of
proving that he acted in conformity therewith on
a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of
a pertinent trait of his character offered
by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a
pertinent trait of character of the victim
of the crime offered by the prosecution in a
homicide case to rebut evidence that the
victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of
the character of a witness, as provided in
Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crime, wrongs, or acts. Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to
show that he acted in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On December 2, 1988, Mr. Morrell was convicted by a jury
robbery, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
section 76-6-301 (R. 118). The trial court sentenced Mr. Morrell
a term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 122).
The Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Morrell's conviction in
decision filed on November 30, 1990, and denied rehearing of the
case in an order filed on January 15, 1991.
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B. FACTS
Mr. Morrell was tried for aggravated robbery of Matthew
Moor, a pizza delivery person, and convicted of simple robbery
(R. 23-24, 30; 1 1 8 ) A
Mr. Morrell admitted the intent element of robbery 2 —it was
his conscious objective and desire to take money from Mr. Moor
(because Mr. Moor owed it to him from a previous illegal drug
transaction) (T.2 25-27).

Under either version of facts, that of

Mr. Moor or that of Mr. Morrell, the facts reflect Mr. Morrell's

1. Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-301 defines robbery as
follows:
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional
taking of personal property in the possession of
another from his person, or immediate presence,
against his will, accomplished by means of force
or fear.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-302 defines aggravated robbery
as follows:
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if
in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601; or
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon
another.
2. Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-103 defines the requisite
level of intent for robbery as follows:
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or
willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is
his conscious objective or desire to engage in
the conduct or cause the result.
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conscious objective and desire to take money from Mr. Moor.3
Over Mr. Morrell's objection, evidence was admitted
concerning Mr. Morrell's guilty plea to a charge involving the
robbery of a pizza delivery person some three months prior to
Mr. Morrell's encounter with Mr. Moor (T.2 73-80).

At trial, the

prosecutor argued that the evidence of the extrinsic robbery was
admissible to show Mr. Morrell's intent, and explicitly disavowed
the argument that the extrinsic robbery was admissible to show modus
operandi (M.H. 17-21, 27). The trial court indicated that the
evidence of the extrinsic robbery was admissible to show intent,
plan, preparation, and modus operandi (M.H. 29, T. 100), and also
ruled the guilty plea admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence
609(a)(2) as proof of a crime of dishonesty (M.H. 4-5). The jury
was instructed that the evidence of the extrinsic robbery could be
used for impeachment purposes and to show "proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident." (R. 98-99).
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the admission
of the evidence of the extrinsic robbery under Utah Rule of Evidence

3. According to Mr. Moor, Mr. Morrell held Mr. Moor at
knifepoint, informed him that he was being robbed, and forced
Mr. Moor to drive to several locations in Salt Lake City because the
amount of money Mr. Moor had on his person did not satisfy
Mr. Morrell (T. 12-68).
According to Mr. Morrell, Mr. Morrell grabbed Mr. Moor
during their initial encounter, but did not use a weapon or threats
to collect the debt because Mr. Moor acknowledged the debt and took
the initiative in driving Mr Morrell to several locations with the
stated purpose of procuring money to repay Mr. Morrell (T.2 20-66).
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404(b) as proof of Mr. Morrell's intent, without any accounting for
the breadth of the jury instruction on the permissible use of the
evidence.

The court stated,

Defendant directly challenged the element of
intent. He claimed he was only trying to collect
a debt through somewhat insistent, but not
unlawful, means. Defendant was being tried for
aggravated robbery, which is "the unlawful and
intentional taking of personal property" from
another, "against his will," by threat or use of
"a dangerous weapon." Utah Code Ann. §§
76-6-301(1), -302(l)(a) (1990). The only two
controverted elements of the charge were the use
of a weapon and defendant's intent. Therefore,
it was critical for the state that it discredit
defendant's claim of a coincidental encounter
with Mr. Moor. Admission of prior bad acts is
proper when it tends to prove a contested
material element of the crime charged. Evidence
of the prior robbery was highly probative of
defendant's intent in the present case.
Morrell. 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 27-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(footnote
and citations omitted).
In analyzing the admission of the evidence of the extrinsic
robbery under Utah Rule of Evidence 403,4 the Court of Appeals did
not address the concern that the similarity of the extrinsic robbery
and the crime charged was likely to result in a verdict based on
perceptions of Mr. Morrell's propensity to rob pizza delivery
people.

The court stated,

4. The rule provides,
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
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Testimony concerning the prior robbery was
the only evidence, other than defendant's and
Moor's conflicting testimony, bearing on whether
defendant's intent was to rob Moor or merely to
secure payment of money defendant believed he was
owed. The testimony, then, was clearly
prejudicial to defendant. It was however,
extremely probative of defendant's intent during
the incident with Moor. The two robberies for
which defendant was charged occurred within
months of each other. Each manifested an almost
identical factual pattern. There was strong
evidence of defendant's guilt in the prior
robbery in view of competent eyewitness testimony
from the victim in that case. The state had a
great need to present this evidence to
demonstrate intent; no effective alternative
proof was available.
Morrell, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28.
In a petition for rehearing, Mr. Morrell argued that the
Court of Appeals was incorrect in its conclusion that intent was at
issue and justified the admission of the extrinsic robbery.5
He also asked the Court of Appeals to dispose of the
concern that in light of the similarity of the extrinsic robbery and
the crime charged, and in light of the confusing jury

5. Petition for rehearing at 2-4, relying on Graham,
Handbook of Federal Evidence, section 404.5, at page 203 footnote 8
("Slough, 'Relevance Unraveled,' 6 Kan. L.Rev. 28, 48 (1957),
describes criminal intent 'as that state of mind which negatives
accident, inadvertence or casualty.'"); McCormick on Evidence,
section 190, 1987 supplement at 57 ("If the defendant does not deny
that his acts were deliberate, then the prosecution may not
introduce the evidence^merely to show that the acts were not
accidental."); United States v. Shackleford. 738 F.2d 776, 781 (7th
Cir. 1984)(under federal rule of evidence, evidence of other crimes
are not admissible to prove intent when intent is merely a formal
issue that may be inferred from defendants' actions). For cases
demonstrating that intent may be inferred from acts, see e.g.
State v. Kazda, 302 P.2d 486, 488 (Utah 1964)(intent to commit
aggravated robbery inferred from facts of case); State v. Guiterrez,
714 P.2d 295 (Utah 1986)(per curiam)(same).
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instruction, it was practically guaranteed that th€> jury convicted
Mr. Morrell on the basis of his perceived propensity to rob pizza
delivery people.6
The Court of Appeals denied rehearing.

REASON WHY QUESTION PRESENTED JUSTIFIES ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT
As noted above, the question before this Court in this
petition is,
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b), is
evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts
admissible to show "intent" when the requisite
level of criminal intent is merely a formal issue
that may be inferred from the physical actions of
the defendant?
The Court of Appeals' broad interpretation of the intent
exception to Rule 404(b) is a precedent that portends to defeat the
well established practice of this Court to carefully limit the
admission of evidence of other crimes.

As this Court has

recognized, evidence of other crimes is presumptively prejudicial.7

6. Petition for rehearing at 5 n. 2, relying on United
States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 780 (7th Cir. 1984)("The jury
was left to decide what the terms 'motive,' 'intent,' 'plan,' etc.
might mean in the context of this case and whether the evidence fit
into any one of these categories. The jury would have to study
Weinstein's chapter on 'Relevancy and Its Limits' in order to
accomplish that assignment properly."); and Graham, Handbook of
Federal Evidence, section 404.5, page 223 and n. 23 (explaining that
jurors are more likely to convict on the basis of a defendant's
perceived propensity toward criminal action, rather than on the
evidence relevant to the charge in question, in cases in which
extrinsic crimes greatly resemble crimes charged).
7. State v. Saunders. 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985).
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Under Utah law, intent is an element of every crime, 8 and this
Court's opinions interpreting the intent exception to Rule of
Evidence 404(b), accordingly, have been quite narrow.9
This Court should grant the writ to maintain the integrity
of Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b).

"To allow intent automatically to

become an issue in that class of cases in which intent is inferable
from the nature of the act charged would create an exception that
'would virtually swallow the rule against admission of evidence or
prior misconduct.'"

United States v. Shackleford. 738 F.2d 776, 781

(7th Cir. 1984), quoting United States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 1001, 1009
(6th Cir. 1975).

8. Utah Code Ann. section 76-1-501 explains this general
principle of criminal law:
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is
presumed to be innocent until each element of the
offense charged against him is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the
defendant shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element
of the offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant
circumstances, or results of conduct
proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the
definition of the offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
9. E.g. State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 291, 295-296 (Utah
1988)(evidence of extrinsic crimes admissible to show specific
intent to kidnap in context of contradictory evidence on intent
issue; defendant entitled to clear jury instruction on limited use
of evidence); State v. Featherston. 781 P.2d 424, 426-428 (Utah
1989)(defendant's sexual conduct seven or eight hours prior to
sexual assault was not admissible to show defendant's intent; even
if the evidence of extrinsic wrongdoings were probative, prejudicial
impact required exclusion).
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Morrell requests that this Court grant a writ of
certiorari on question 1.
Respectfully submitted this

j / day of February,

1991.

ELIZABETH HdLj3R0C
Attorney foi| $lr. Morrell

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, hereby certify that ten copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 and four copies to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
this

I j day of February, 1991.

this

DELIVERED by
of February, 1991.
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APPENDIX 1

39 (JV88). ^>ee aiso p*vie, IVM<U>ICM* *HU magis-Except as otherwise noted, we set forth the
trates in the Federal Courts, 88 Harv. L. Rev. facts in the manner most consistent with the
779, 796-97 (1975). Also, unless a reference jury's verdict. On September 4, 1988,
to a magistrate. expressly states otherwise, Matthew Moor, a pizza delivery driver emplmagistrates appointed to act as masters are oyed by Ambassador^Pizza in Salt Lake City,
specifically excepted from the requirements of was robbed while attempting to deliver a pizza
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce- ordered by telephone. As Moor drove to the
dure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(0- In my: view, it neighborhood of 813 Genessee Streeu the
is a mistake for this Court to look to the tre- address to which he was to deliver the pizza,
atment of federal magistrates for purposes of Moor saw defendant Kenneth Morrell standing
analogy to the treatment of masters under on a corner and asked him for directions.
Rule 53.
Moor then drove a very short distance to 813
Genessee Street and discovered that the house
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: (Concurring was dark and apparently unoccupied. As
and Dissenting)
Moor returned to his car, defendant approaJ concur in the majority opinion, except that ched him and asked to purchase the pizza.
I would remand the case to the trial court for Moor offered to sell defendant the pizza for
final determination of the amount of fees to five dollars. Defendant pressed an object to
be awarded. Since we have determined that the Moor's neck and told Moor that he was being
trial court erroneously relied on the flawed robbed.
master's report, the proper procedure in my
Defendant got into the car with Moor and
opinion is to remand the issue back to the trial demanded money from him. When Moor did
court for reconsideration and final determin- not produce the amount of money that defeation without regard to the report. I believe ndant wanted, defendant had Moor drive to
that it is premature for us to accept and another location in order to search the car for
approve the stipulation without first allowing more money. He found none. Defendant then
it to be presented to and considered by the ordered Moor to drive to a house in the
trial court.
avenues area in order to set up a robbery of a
Domino's Pizza delivery driver. Upon telephoning, defendant found Domino's Pizza
closed and told Moor that he had better
produce more money. Moor suggested that
Cite as
they drive to his friend's house to get money,
149 Utah Adv. Rep. 26
and defendant agreed.
IN THE
Moor drove to the home of Ivan Ilov and
sat in the driveway honking the horn. When
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Ilov approached the car he discerned that
The STATE of Utah,
Moor was in some sort of trouble. Moor
* Plaintiff and Appellee,
asked Ilov for money, stating that defendant
v.
was holding a knife to him. Ilov broke
Kenneth James MORRELL,
through the window and attempted to restrain
Defendant and Appellant.
defendant. Defendant escaped and Moor and
Ilov gave chase. As Moor reached him, defeNo. 890031-CA
ndant hit Moor, breaking Moor's nose. Moor
FILED: November 30, 1990
caught defendant again and Ilov assisted in
restraining him. A passing taxi driver summThird District, Salt Lake County
oned police.
The Honorable Leonard H. Russon
When the police arrived, one officer took
custody
of defendant from Ilov and asked
ATTORNEYS:
defendant: "What's going on?" Defendant did
Debra K. Loy and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt
not respond. Defendant was arrested after
Lake City, for Appellant
Moor was interviewed by another officer and
R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt the officers concluded that a robbery had
occurred.
Lake City, for Appellee
At trial, defendant testified he saw Moor
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme.
driving in defendant's neighborhood and
recognized both Moor and his car. He stated
ORME, Judge:
that he had sold some marijuana to Moor at a
Defendant Morrell appeals his conviction party for which Moor still owed money to
for robbery, a second degree felony in viola- defendant. Defendant claimed that when Moor
tion of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301 (1990). pulled over to ask street directions of defen-

Moor about the money owed for the marijuana. Moor did not have enough money to
satisfy the debt and suggested that they go
elsewhere to get more money. Eventually,
defendant and Moor arrived at Ilov's home,
where the defendant's account of the events
largely corresponds with Moor's.
The trial court precluded defense counsel
from cross-examining Moor concerning his
drug and alcohol use, and any related possible
effect on his ability to recall prior encounters
with defendant which may have supported
defendant's claim of a drug sales debt. The
court also allowed testimony by a police detective that the telephone used to place the
pizza order incident to the robbery in this
case, like others which had occurred, was not
located at the address stated by the person
placing the order.
The jury convicted defendant of robbery.
On appeal, defendant raises several evidentiary
issues. First, defendant attacks the trial
court's admission of evidence of his guilty
plea to a prior robbery and of the facts underlying that plea. Second, defendant challenges
the admission of evidence of his silence in
response to the initial question put to him by
police. Third, defendant claims that the trial
court improperly limited cross-examination
of the robbery victim1 and in admitting
hearsay testimony by a police officer.
EVIDENCE OF THE PRIOR ROBBERY
Defendant challenges, under rule 609(a)(2)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the admission
of his guilty plea to a similar robbery of a
pizza deliveryman. Defendant claims that a
guilty plea is not equivalent to a conviction
and that robbery is not a crime of dishonesty
automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2).
We review the trial court's evidentiary rulings
only for an abuse of discretion which results
in prejudice to substantial rights. State v.
Brown, 111 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah Ct. App.
1989); State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). The state concedes that
admission of the guilty plea to theft, on the
ground that theft may automatically be treated
as a crime of dishonesty, was improper.2 We
agree.
Rule 609(a)(2) provides that evidence of
conviction for any crime involving dishonesty
or a false statement is admissible to attack the
credibility of a witness. The focus of the rule
concerns impeachment based on the probability that a particular witness may not be telling
the truth as evidenced by prior acts of dishonesty on the part of that witness. Any act
done with knowledge of its unlawfulness involves a measure of dishonesty as commonly
defined. Nonetheless, Rule 609(a)(2) was
HraffpH t n rpctrirt

fliitnmatir

aHmissihilitv

in

mony. See State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217,
222 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citing legislative history of subsection
609(a)(2)).
While some dispute exists as to whether
robbery should be classified as a crime'of
dishonesty, see State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12,
21-22 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (Garff, J., concurring), it is established under Utah law that
the crime of robbery does not automatically
qualify for admission under Rule 609(a)(2).
State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 656 (Utah 1989)
(robbery conviction not automatically admissible); State v. Brown, 111 P.2d 1093, 109495 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (conviction of theft
crimes not automatically admissible); State v.
Wight, 765 P.2d at 17-19 (aggravated
robbery conviction not automatically admissible).
The trial court made no inquiry into the
facts underlying defendant's guilty plea in its
consideration of admissibility. Therefore,
nothing in the record demonstrates a consideration of facts relative to defendant's prior
theft to determine their relevance, if any, to
defendant's propensity to tell the truth.3 See
Wight, 765 P.2d at 18 (under 609(a)(2), crime
of robbery may be admissible if underlying
facts demonstrate impairment of credibility).
Although conceding the guilty plea , could
not properly come in under Rule 609, the state
claims we should nonetheless affirm because
evidence of the facts underlying the. prior
robbery charge, offered through the testimony
of the victim in that case, was admissible
under Rule 404(b) as probative of defendant's
intent to rob Moor, and in refutation of defendant's claim that he was merely attempting
collection of a debt. Rule 404(b) establishes
certain circumstances in which evidence of
other crimes may be admitted:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts is not admissible to prove the,
character of a person in order to,
show that he acted in conformity^
therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowl-.
edge, identity, or absence of,
mistake or accident.
Utah R. Evid. 404(b).
• Defendant directly challenged the element of
intent. He claimed he was only trying-to
collect a debt through somewhat insistent* trot
not unlawful, means; Defendant. was being
tried for aggravated robbery, which isr "the
unlawful and intentional taking of personal
property" from another, "against his will,* by
threat or use of "a dangerous weapon." Utah
Code Ann. §§76-6-301(1). -302(l)(a)

defendant's intent. Ifteretore, it was critical
for the state that it discredit defendant's claim
of a coincidental encounter with Moor.
Admission of prior bad acts is proper when it
tends to prove a contested material element of
the crime charged. State v^.Featherson, 781
P ^ d 424, 426 (Utah 1989); Store v. Shaffer,
725 P.2d 1301, 1307 (Utah 1986). Evidence of
the;prior robbery was highly probative, of
defendant's intent in the present case.* ,
*
''Even .though the. evidence -was otherwise
admissible under Rule 404(b), we must nevertheless determine whether the prejudicial
nature of the evidence substantially overshadowed its probative value under Utah Rule of
Evidence 403. See State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d
459, 462 (Utah 1989). This is a fact-intensive
question, delegated by the Rules of Evidence
to the discretion of the trial court. We therefore review determinations of admissibility
under Rule 403 only for abuse of discretion. Id.
Only if discretion is abused and prejudice
results will the court's mistake constitute
reversible error. Id.
In State v. Stickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah
1988), the Utah Supreme Court listed several
factors which are helpful in balancing probativeness and prejudice.
In deciding whether the danger of
unfair prejudice and the like substantially outweighs the incremental
probative value, a variety of matters
must be considered, including the
strength of the evidence as to the
commission of the other crime, the
similarities between the crimes, the
interval of time that has elapsed
between the crimes, the need for the
evidence, the efficacy of alternative
proof and the degree to which the
evidence probably will rouse the
jury to overmastering hostility.
Id. at 295-96 (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick
on Evidence, §190 at 565 (3d ed. 1984)). The
record reflects that counsel for defendant and
the state presented arguments based on these
factors. The trial court then ruled that the
evidence was admissible.
Testimony concerning the prior robbery was
the only evidence, other than defendant's and
Moor's conflicting testimoriy, bearing on
whether defendant's intent was to rob Moor
or merely to secure payment of money defendant believed he was owed. The testimony,
then, was clearly prejudicial to defendant. It
was, however, extremely probative of defendant's intent during the incident with Moor.
The two robberies for which defendant was
charged occurred within months of each other.
Each manifested an almost identical factual
Dattern. There was strong evidence of defen-
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no effective alternative proof was available* Cf
Shickles, 760 P.2d at 296 (even' where
"other evidences of defendant's intent*/arc
introduced, "the use of ;.. other-crimes.qrtt
dence" is "not necessarily". preduded)otWc
cannot say that the trial court abused :its^dlj£
cretion in weighing these factors and detenu?
ining that the probative value substantially
outweighed the prejudicial effect. It was t h £
refore not incumbent, upon the court.^to
exclude the evidence under Rule 403. Because
admission of the evidence was proper, under
Rule 404(b), and not barred by Rule 403t any
error in admission of the guilty plea under
Rule 609(a)(2) is harmless.
EVIDENCE OF PRE-AfZRAMM SILENCE]
During the cross-examination of one
officer, the prosecution elicited testimony of
defendant's silence when he was asked by
another police officer what was happening.
This question was asked immediately after the
arrival of the officers, who took control of
defendant from Ilov. No Miranda warning
had been given, and defendant claims for this
reason that the court erred in allowing improper comment on his silence. The state asserts
that the testimony was proper as demonstrating intent to rob Moor since defendant did
not exculpate himself by stating that he was
merely endeavoring to collect a debt.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966), the Supreme Court held that the prosecution is barred from using statements stemming from custodial interrogation of a defendant unless the defendant had been informed of the right to remain silent, the right to
counsel, the right to appointed counsel if
indigent, and that any statement may be used
against the defendant. Not all police inquiry is
made in the context of custodial interrogation.
On the contrary,
[t]he Utah Supreme Court has identified several key factors to consider in order to determine when a
defendant
who has not been formally
arrested is in custody. They are: (1) the site of interrogation; (2) whether the investig a t i o n f o c u s e d on the
accused; (3) whether the
objective indicia of arrest
were present; and (4) the
length and form of interrogation.
Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d
- 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983). Another
factor which we find pertinent to
our analysis was recognized by our
fWann counterpart in State v.

place of interrogation freely and
willingly. Id. at 1212.
State v. Sampson, 143 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 15
(Ct. App. 1990).
Treating these factors in order, the following conclusions emerge. First, the site of
interrogation was a public parking lot which,
unlike interrogation at the police station, see id.,
does not suggest custody. Second, the
investigation had not yet focused on defendant. When the officers arrived at the scene
and observed defendant restrained by Ilov,
they knew nothing more than that an altercation had been reported, and that a pizza driver
was possibly missing in the same general vicinity. The officers had no reason to know or
suspect that the two reports were connected.
Nor did they know the reason for the altercation and which party to the altercation, if
any, was the culprit. At the time of the question the officers did not know if a crime had
been committed, nor had any investigation yet
focused on defendant. Contemporaneously
with the question, but some distance from
where it was asked, Moor exited a nearby
restaurant, where he had gone to attend to his
broken nose, and spoke with another officer
who determined that Moor was the victim of a
robbery and defendant was the apparent perpetrator. Nothing more was asked of defendant from that time. To that point, defendant's encounter with the police constituted
nothing more than a general investigation to
determine whether a crime had even been
committed. Third, while it is apparent that
defendant had been momentarily restrained by
police officers when the question was put to
him, other objective indicia of arrest were
lacking. Defendant was not handcuffed,
placed in a police vehicle, or told he was
under arrest. Fourth, the length of interrogation was exceptionally brief and the form of
interrogation, on which ''Utah courts have
placed a great deal of emphasis," id., was
merely investigatory and in no sense accusatory. See id. The question asked of defendant
was merely part of a preliminary attempt to
ascertain exactly that which was asked-"What's going on?" Fifth, while defendant
had not come to the place of questioning
voluntarily, he had also not been taken there
by police against his will-he was chased
there by citizens trying to apprehend him. *fWhile the fifth factor might be taken as
"relatively ^neutral,'", id., each of the\other
factors are not suggestive of custody. Taken
together, the factors compel the conclusion
that defendant was not subject to custodial
interrogation and no Miranda warning was
required.5 See also State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d
385, 391 (Utah 1986) (brief questioning inside

warning upon asking investigatory question).
HEARSAY & LIMITATION OF CROSS^ ,
EXAMINATION
';
Defendant claims that the court's limitation
of cross-examination of Moor and t the
admission of certain hearsay testimony was
erroneous.6 We review evidentiary rulings for
a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Brown,
771 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
On direct examination, Moor testified he
had never seen defendant at a party. On crossexamination Moor conceded that he had attended parties of which he thereafter did not
have complete recollection. Defense counsel
asked if Moor's memory deficiency might be
related to drug or alcohol use and whether it
was possible that Moor had met defendant at
such a party and did not recall the encounter
because of the influence of alcohol or drugs.
The court sustained the prosecution's objections to both questions.
Defendant had the right to impeach Moor's
credibility by attacking his memory. Utah R.
Evid. 607. Even though this right is limited by
the witness's right to be free from harassment
and humiliation, State v. Chesnut, 621 P.2d
1228, 1233 (Utah 1980), defendant must be
allowed to elicit testimony concerning a
witness's ability to recall the event about
which the witness is testifying. Moor's possible alcohol and drug use and any impact on
his memory were relevant to the credibility of
his testimony refuting defendants claimed
defense of debt collection growing out of prior
dealings with Moor. Consequently, it was
error for the court to prevent testimony which
probed Moor's possible inability to remember
the party at which defendant claimed to have
met him and to have sold him drugs for which
Moor was to pay defendant later.
• •;" '
Defendant also challenges a detective's
testimony concerning the telephone locations
from which pizza orders were made and the
telephone numbers left with the order taker.
The detective testified that in both the robbery
at issue and the prior robbery, the number left
did not correspond to the pay telephone from
which the call had been made, although^in
both instances the numbers were merely rearranged. Defendant claims this testimony^was
improper hearsay.
»
• , ^oi:z[
The state claims^ the business records^and
public records exceptions of Utah Rule of
Evidence 803 allow admission of the'officer's
testimony. See Utah R. Evid. 803(6)^(8).
However, the police Teport, and not the business record of the pizza company, was the
source to which the officer referred in his
testimony. Police reports are not eligible for
admission under either of these provisions of
Rnlp 803 pyppnt in pertain limited circumsta-

1184-86 (Utah 1983).
We need not determine, however, whether
the court's errors in limiting crossexamination of Moor and permitting the detective's hearsay testimony rise to the level of a
clear abuse of discretion. Any error in either
instance was harmless and would not entitle
defendant to reversal. See State v. Tillman,
750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987).
Concerning the limitations on crossexamination, defendant was allowed to present
his defense of debt collection stemming from
an alleged marijuana sale to Moor. The jury
learned that defendant claimed Moor used
illegal drugs and had heard Moor admit that
he had been to parties of which he later had
no memory. While defendant should have
been allowed to pursue questioning of Moor's
memory ability, defendant established the
important point that Moor's memory of
parties was imperfect, a matter the jury was
free to consider in deciding Moor's credibility.
The exact reason for this deficiency was much
less important.
Concerning the telephone testimony, the
facts of defendant's prior robbery were properly introduced through the testimony of the
victim in that incident. Defendant also admitted his participation in that robbery. The
precise methodology of telephone usage in
both instances was therefore comparatively
inconsequential to the outcome.
Viewing the other substantial evidence supporting defendant's conviction, we cannot say
that defendant might not have been convicted
without the officer's testimony concerning the
telephone numbers or if the jury had learned
more about the exact reason Moor had incomplete recall of some parties he had attended.
CONCLUSION
While the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of the prior robbery under Rule 609,
the same evidence was properly admitted
under Rule 404(b). Defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation, and therefore
was not entitled to a Miranda warning.
Finally, any error in admission of the officer's
hearsay testimony concerning the phone
numbers and the limitation on crossexamination concerning Moor's prior drug or
alcohol use was harmless. Defendant's conviction is accordingly affirmed.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Judith M. Billings, Judge
1. Defendant also raises a challenge under the
Confrontation Clause, U.S. Const, amend. VI,
accprtino that he was denied the constitutional right

tion grounds. See State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 34
(Utah) (failure to object precludes review of evidentiary matters except in case of plain error), cerr.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989).
2. The state argues, however, that the guilty plea
should be treated as a conviction for purposes of
Rule 609(a)(2), relying on Srare v. Delashmutt, 676
P.2d 383, 384 (Utah 1983)(per curiam). In our view,
Delashmutt has questionable value as precedent.
Significant case law concerning the nature of guilty
pleas has developed since Delashmutt which gives
doubt to its continued vitality. See, e.g., State v.
Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1987); State v. Kayf
717 P.2d 1294, 1303-5 (Utah 1986). Defendant had
merely entered his plea on the other charge, and had
neither been adjudged guilty nor sentenced by the
court. In view of the liberality with which motions
to withdraw guilty pleas are to be granted prior to
sentence, see, e.g., Gallegos, 738 P.2d at 1042
("presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea
should, in general, be liberally granted"), we see real
difficulty, for Rule 609(a)(2) purposes, in equating a
mere guilty plea, prior to sentencing, with an actual
conviction. As explained hereafter, however, we
need not definitively decide this issue since any error
in admission of the guilty plea under Rule 609 was
harmless in view of the admissibility of other evidence of the crime under Rule 404(b).
3. Convictions not admissible under Rule 609(a)(2)
may yet be admissible under subsection (a)(1), which
provides for admission of prior convictions where
the court determines that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. The court must inquire
into the probative value of the facts supporting the
conviction and balance them against potential prejudice. State v. Banner, 111 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah
1986). In Banner, the Supreme Court listed five
factors to be considered. Id. The trial court in this
case did not consider the Banner factors and we
therefore do not decide whether the guilty plea
could have been admitted under Rule 609(a)(1). Nor
did the state argue that defendant's particular brand
of robbery—characterized by false statements
concerning his telephone number, his whereabouts,
and his desire to obtain and pay for pizza-had
sufficient bearing on his propensity to tell the truth
to distinguish his crime from garden-variety theft
so as to permit the evidence to come in under either
Rule 609(a)(2) or 609(a)(1).
4. Defendant was convicted of simple robbery under
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-301 (1990), manifesting
that the jury did not find he used or threatened the
use of a dangerous weapon. The jury apparently
concluded that the object defendant pressed against
Moor was only a plastic nametag.
5. In view of our disposition, we need not consider
the state's alternative argument that, in any event,
defendant's silence was admissible to impeach a
defense offered for the first time at trial. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 605-607 (1982). But see
People v. Jacobs, 158 Cal. App. 3d 740, 750,
204 Cal. Rptr. 849, 856 (1984) (rejecting Fletcher v.
Weir analysis under state constitutional provision
nearly identical to federal counterpart); State v.
Davis, 38 Wash. App. 600, 686 P.2d 1143, 1145-46
(1984) (rejecting Fletcher v. Weir analysis under
state constitutional provision identical to federal
*—„^v. \/*/cr»n v State. 691 P.2d 1056, 1059-

the court's decisions in these respects can be sustained under the Utah Rules of Evidence, his right to
confrontation was nonetheless denied. See note 1,
supra.
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OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
Appellant, the Redevelopment Agency of
Salt Lake City (RDA), seeks reversal of the
district court's order granting partial summary
judgment in favor of appellee Robert C.
Nelson dba The Magazine Shop,1 and denying
RDA's motion for partial summary judgment.
In 1969, the Utah Legislature adopted the

vi a^4., WHICH Lrcaies ana empowers municipal
redevelopment agencies such as the RDA to
acquire and redevelop property determined to
be "blighted." See Redevelopment Agency of
Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1297
(Utah 1987). Pursuant to this act, Salt Lake
City's Board of Commissioners (Commission)
and, subsequently, its City Council, were
designated to act as the city's redevelopment
agency. Id. defendants Nelson, W & G
Company, Broadway Music, J. Ross Trapp,
National Department Store, and Downtown
Athletic Club (Landowners), at the times relevant to these events at issue in this case, were
property owners having separate interests in
properties on Block 57 in Salt Lake City.
On February 4, 1971, the RDA adopted the
Central Business District (CBD) V/est Neighborhood Development Program, which included two and one-half blocks of the downtown Salt Lake City business district. In May
1975, the RDA passed a resolution to consider
the adoption of an ordinance amending the
redevelopment plan to include an additional
eleven blocks of the downtown business district, including Block 57. In this resolution, the
RDA designated this area as a redevelopment
survey area, and decided that it required
further study to determine whether one or
more redevelopment projects within its boundaries were feasible. It directed the RDA staff
to select one or more project areas comprising
"all or part of the above described redevelopment survey area," and to formulate a preliminary redevelopment plan.
To this end, the public hearings were held
on the adoption of this ordinance on July 31
and August 4, 1975 before the RDA, and on
September 3, 1975 before the Commission.
Although the RDA notified every property
owner in the affected area by mail prior to the
hearings, no Landowners attended these hearings.
During the hearings, the RDA's executive
director, Michael Chitwood, assured those
present that all owners of property designated
for redevelopment by the RDA would be
provided notice and hearing, along with detailed architectural information about the renovation of their properties, and that property
acquisition would not occur without their
approval and consent.
On September 10, 1975, the Commission
passed an ordinance adopting the CBD West
Neighborhood Development Plan and mailed a
copy of the ordinance to every property owner
in the affected area, including Landowners.
On May 14, 1982, the RDA again notified
all affected property owners, including Landowners, of another set of public hearings to be
held for the purpose of amending and updating the CRD W**ct N^ioVihnrVir^/i rk«™i~~

do not consider his related claim that even n
urt's decisions in these respects can be sustander the Utah Rules of Evidence, his right to
ntation was nonetheless denied. See note 1,

Cite as

149 Utah Adv. Rep. 31
IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
t G. COMPANY, a Utah general
lership; Daroi Krantz, an individual, dba
idway Music; J. Ross Trapp, Trustee of
floss Trapp Trust and Trustee of the June
)p Trust; National Department Store, a
n corporation; Robert C. Nelson, dba The
;azine Shop; and Downtown Athletic Club,
tah corporation,
Plaintiffs and Appellee,
v.
DEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF SALT
KE CITY, Salt Lake City Corporation,
i L. Wilson, in his official capacity as a
nber and chief operating officer of the
ird of Directors of the Redevelopment
ency of Salt Lake City; Ronald J.
litehead, Grant Mabey, Sidney R.
nnesbeck, Earl S. Hardwick, lone M. Davis
1 Edward Parker, in their official capacities
members of the Board of Directors of the
development Agency of Salt Lake City, and
chael Chit wood, in his official capacity as
? Executive Director of the Redevelopment
;ency of Salt Lake City,
Defendants and Appellants.
>. 890285-CA
LED: November 30, 1990
lird District, Salt Lake County
onorable Raymond S. Uno
TTORNEYS:
arold A. Hintze, Provo, for Appellants
obert S. Campbell, Jr. and Barney Gesas,
Salt Lake City, for Appellee
efore Judges Garff, Jackson, and Orme.
OPINION
IARFF,

Judge:

Appellant, the Redevelopment Agency of
ialt Lake City (RDA), seeks reversal of the
listrict court's order granting partial summary
udgment in favor of appellee Robert C.
kelson dba The Magazine Shop,1 and denying
flDA's motion for partial summary judgment.
-~™ Al _ TUOK T ^aUlature adopted the

et seq., wmui uvmw «*.*». r^
redevelopment agencies such as the RDA to
acquire and redevelop property determined to
be "blighted." See Redevelopment Agency of
Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1297
(Utah 1987). Pursuant to this act, Salt Lake
City's Board of Commissioners (Commission)
and, subsequently, its City Council, were
designated to act as the city's redevelopment
agency. Id. defendants Nelson, W & G
Company, Broadway Music, J. Ross Trapp,
National Department Store, and Downtown
Athletic Club (Landowners), at the times relevant to these events at issue in this case, were
property owners having separate interests in
properties on Block 57 in Salt Lake City.
On February 4, 1971, the RDA adopted the
Central Business District (CBD) West Neighborhood Development Program, which included two and one-half blocks of the downtown Salt Lake City business district. In May
1975, the RDA passed a resolution to consider
the adoption of an ordinance amending the
redevelopment plan to include an additional
eleven blocks of the downtown business district, including Block 57. In this resolution, the
RDA designated this area as a redevelopment
survey area, and decided that it required
further study to determine whether one or
more redevelopment projects within its boundaries were feasible. It directed the RDA staff
to select one or more project areas comprising
"all or part of the above described redevelopment survey area," and to formulate a preliminary redevelopment plan.
To this end, the public hearings were held
on the adoption of this ordinance on July 31
and August 4, 1975 before the RDA, and on
September 3, 1975 before the Commission.
Although the RDA notified every property
owner in the affected area by mail prior to the
hearings, no Landowners attended these hearings.
During the hearings, the RDA's executive
director, Michael Chitwood, assured those
present that all owners of property designated
for redevelopment by the RDA would be
provided notice and hearing, along with detailed architectural information about the renovation of their properties, and that property
acquisition would not occur without their
approval and consent.
On September 10, 1975, the Commission
passed an ordinance adopting the CBD West
Neighborhood Development Plan and mailed a
copy of the ordinance to every property owner
in the affected area, including Landowners.
On May 14, 1982, the RDA again notified
all affected property owners, including Landowners, of another set of public hearings to be
held for the purpose of amending and updat e the CBD West Neighborhood Develop-
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ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR REHEARING

The State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 890031-CA

Kenneth James Morrell,
Defendant and Appellant.
Before Judges Orate, Bench, and B i l l i n g s .

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon Appellant's
Petition for Rehearing, filed January 9, 1991,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is denied.
Dated this

j&*

FOR THE COURT:

Clerk of the Court

ay of January, 1991.
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I hereby certify that on the 15th day of January, 1991, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING REHEARING was
hand-delivered or deposited in the United States mail.
Debra K. Loy
Elizabeth Holbrook
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association
Attorneys at Law
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
R. Paul Van Dam
State Attorney General
Christine F. Soltis
Assistant Attorney General
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DATED this 15th day of January, 1991.
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